A significant part of this modification happens to be the increase associated with “subprime” market, seen as an loans with a high standard prices, dominance by specific subprime loan providers in place of full-service loan providers, and small coverage by the secondary home loan market. In this paper, we consider these as well as other “stylized facts” with standard tools utilized by monetary economists to spell it out market framework in other contexts. We use three models to look at market framework: an option-based approach to mortgage pricing by which we argue that subprime choices are distinct from prime choices, causing various agreements and costs; and two models centered on asymmetric information–one with asymmetry between borrowers and loan providers, and something utilizing the asymmetry between loan providers as well as the market that is secondary. Both in of this asymmetric-information models, investors create incentives for borrowers or loan vendors to expose information, mainly through expenses of rejection.
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