A significant part regarding the modification is the increase for the “subprime” market, seen as a loans with a high standard prices, dominance by specific subprime loan providers as opposed to full-service loan providers, and little protection by the additional home loan market. In this paper, we consider these as well as other “stylized facts” with standard tools employed by economic economists to explain market framework various other contexts. We utilize three models to look at market framework: an option-based approach to mortgage pricing by which we argue that subprime choices are distinctive from prime choices, causing various agreements and costs; and two models according to asymmetric information–one with asymmetry between borrowers and loan providers, plus one utilizing the asymmetry between lenders therefore the additional market. Both in for the asymmetric-information models, investors put up incentives for borrowers or loan sellers to expose information, mainly through expenses of rejection.
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